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Abstract: We conduct an artefactual field experiment to compare the individual preferences 
and propensity to cooperate of three pools of subjects: Undergraduate students, temporary 
workers and permanent workers. We find that students are more selfish and contribute less 
than workers. Temporary and permanent contract workers have similar other-regarding 
preferences and display analogous contribution patterns in an anonymous Public Good Game. 
Keywords: temporary worker; decomposed game technique; dictator game; public good 
game; experiment 
JEL Classification: C72, C93, D23, H41, J54 
 
1. Introduction 
Undergraduate university students can be easily recruited for experiments and are the typical object 
of inquiry in the experimental social sciences. One critical issue linked to this admittedly specific 
population concerns whether the experimental results obtained with students are robust to using other 
populations, such as workers or older age people [1–4]. To address this issue, the literature has compared 
the behavior of undergraduate students with different types of workers, such as nurses [5], Chief 
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Executive Officers [6], workers in a publishing distribution warehouse [7], bicycle messengers [8], and 
clerical workers [9]. 
Our paper relates to this stream of research and it investigates, using an artefactual field experiment [10] 
and a sample of subjects living in an Italian region with high social capital, whether and to what extent 
the other-regarding preferences and cooperative behavior of undergraduate university students differ 
from those of workers, and how these preferences translate into behavior in a strategic setting. We further 
study whether there exists a link between the type of worker’s contractual arrangement (temporary or 
permanent contract) and her social preferences and behavior. The answer to the latter question is still an 
open issue which has not been fully addressed so far. Yet, this line of inquiry deserves investigation, due 
to the rapid diffusion of temporary employment (i.e., a work situation where an employee is hired for a 
pre-determined time limit) in many industrialized countries, in particular in countries providing high 
levels of employment protection [11]. 
From a firm’s perspective, temporary employment reflects the need for a flexible labor demand which 
can be quickly adjusted to workload fluctuations. It also makes it easier for a firm to replace less 
productive people with more productive ones, and may as well favor the inflow of innovative ideas. This 
type of contractual arrangement can however also have negative effects. A high turnover may in fact 
hinder social cohesion, cooperative spirit, organizational commitment and trust in the workplace, and 
increase the probability of opportunistic behavior [12]. In addition, workers who compete in the labor 
market for short-term positions compete more often with other workers for a job, and they may therefore 
display a more competitive attitude. All these factors can lead to substantial economic costs and 
inefficiencies which may cancel out the benefits of a flexible labor demand. 
Since the propensity to cooperate and the other-regarding preferences of permanent workers may vary 
substantially, depending on the type of firm and the business culture of a company, we selected a 
benchmark which we expected to be associated with the highest propensity to cooperation and level  
of pro-sociality. Accordingly, we recruited permanent workers of a co-operative (co-op). 1  The 
importance of cooperation is one of the distinctive features of a co-op, together with the importance 
given to the values of self-help, self-responsibility, democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. Hence, 
one would expect co-op permanent workers to be particularly prone to cooperation (see, e.g., [8]), with 
significant and sizeable differences with respect to non-co-op workers, in particular temporary workers 
who are not members of a co-op. A priori, this makes the sample of permanent co-op workers a 
reasonable upper-bound benchmark to be compared with the preferences and behavior of the other two 
samples. Students, instead, are expected to be the lower bound benchmark for the propensity to cooperate 
and the other-regarding preferences of temporary and permanent workers, as documented in the 
experimental literature showing that students are in general less prosocial than non-students  
(e.g., [6,8,13,14]). 
In our experiment, subjects played a Dictator Game, a Decomposed Game and a Public Good Game. 
These are standard tasks used in the experimental literature to investigate other-regarding preferences 
and cooperative behavior. 
                                                 
1 Co-ops are defined by the International Co-operative Alliance as “autonomous associations of persons united  
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and 
democratically-controlled enterprise”. 
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Our results on the behavior of undergraduate students are similar to those reported in the literature 
with similar subject pools (e.g., [5,8,15–18]). Temporary workers, instead, are significantly more 
cooperative and less opportunistic. In addition, they are also more other-regarding than students and their 
behavior and preferences are very much similar to those of co-op permanent workers. This result is 
notable as temporary workers did not know each other, and they shared very little common experiences, 
either in terms of education, training on the job or specialization. Moreover, the probability of meeting 
again in subsequent occasions was small, which makes reputation a rather weak argument for inducing 
cooperation in a repeated interaction perspective. On the contrary, permanent workers knew each other 
and interacted together on a daily basis in the same workplace. 2 In addition, they worked for the same 
co-operative, and were constantly exposed to the values of the institution they worked for. 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper which, in addition to the comparison between 
students and workers, also applies the experimental methodology to investigate preferences and 
propensity to cooperate of temporary and permanent workers. 3 This paper provides complementary 
evidence to the literature studying workers’ effort provision in a real work environment (e.g., [24,25]) 
and to more traditional sources of information, such as those based on surveys and questionnaires  
(e.g., [26,27]). In particular, we obtain information on the preferences and propensity to cooperate of  
co-op workers, on which previous experimental investigation is surprisingly scarce. A noteworthy 
exception is Burks et al. [8], who provide field experimental evidence that employees at firms that pay 
for performance are significantly less cooperative than those who are members of cooperatives. The 
comparison between temporary and permanent (co-op) workers is a useful starting point to understand 
whether these differences are driven by a different propensity to cooperate of workers in general, and 
whether the possible differences in preferences and behavior may be linked to the specific type of 
contractual arrangement. 
The paper is structured as follows. In next section we describe the three sample pools employed in 
the experiment. In Section 3, we present the experimental design, and in Section 4, we report the results. 
Section 5 contains a discussion of the results and Section 6 concludes. 
  
                                                 
2 We cannot exclude the possibility that, in a given session, some of the students and/or temporary workers knew each other 
from outside the lab. However, this possibility was minimized by the random process adopted to recruit subjects. In 
addition, interactions between participants were anonymous, and, therefore, subjects could not know whether they were 
matched with an acquaintance in a given task. 
3 Other studies investigated the economic and social impact of temporary work arrangements such as, e.g., the existence of 
a gap in the working conditions of permanent and temporary workers, particularly in terms of working rights, training received, 
and wage differentials [19], the role of temporary work as a stepping-stone towards regular employment [20], the relationship 
between temporary work and job satisfaction [21], and the effect of temporary status on the worker’s well-being, mental 
and physical health [12,22,23]. 
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2. The Subject Pools 
The subjects taking part in the experiment were recruited from three different populations: 
undergraduate students of the University of Bologna, temporary employees and permanent employees. 
Students. We recruited 96 undergraduate students with an Economics major from the Forlì Campus 
of the University of Bologna, using the subject pools maintained through ORSEE [28]. 
Temporary workers. The pool of temporary workers that participated to the experiment was supplied 
by Obiettivo Lavoro (OL), a large recruitment agency that operates mainly in Italy, with branches 
operating also in Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Poland, Romania, Paraguay and Peru. OL operates in sectors 
such as health care and social assistance, cleaning and logistics, construction, large scale retail, hotel, 
catering, and tourism, with yearly total revenue of 308 million euros (operating revenue in 2012). It 
manages more than 1,400,000 profiles of workers to be hired to firms or institutions demanding labor 
force. Originally established as a co-operative company in 1997, OL was converted into a public limited 
company in 2003. It has adopted an Ethics Code and in 2007 it obtained the SA8000 certification for its 
Corporate Responsibility practices. 4  The 72 subjects which OL supplied for the experiment were 
temporary workers who had never participated in an economic experiment like ours, nor ever had 
relations with OL before 2003. 
Permanent workers. The pool of cooperative members that took part in the experiment was supplied 
by Formula Servizi (FS), a workers co-operative company founded in 1975, which operates in five Italian 
regions (mainly in Emilia Romagna, where 75% of its revenue is raised). It supplies several services, 
mainly in sectors such as cleaning, catering, maintenance and logistics, with a yearly total revenue of 55 
million euros (operating revenue in 2012). FS has obtained the SA8000 certification for its Corporate 
Responsibility practices in 2003, and has adopted an Ethical Code in 2012. The total number of workers 
in 2012 is 1892, with a prevalence of women (83%) and an average age of 47 years. Among these workers, 
892 are members of the cooperative (“soci”), 890 are employees, while 110 are outsourced workers. For 
our experiment, we recruited 84 subjects only among cooperative members, therefore choosing to focus 
on the most “permanent” set of workers, and we excluded both employees and outsourced staff. None 
of the permanent workers had participated in economic experiments before. 
The details about the socio-demographic characteristics (collected in a questionnaire at the end of the 
experiment) of the three subject pools are in the Appendix. Students differ in many dimensions compared 
to both permanent and temporary workers. Most notably, students are younger, less religious, less likely 
to be married, with a higher education and characterized by a smaller proportion of women. There are 
also a few differences between permanent and temporary workers. In particular, permanent workers are 
older, more likely to be married, more likely to be Christian, and with more years of work experience 
than temporary workers. In all the other dimensions, we do not detect any statistically significant 
difference between temporary and permanent workers. Because of these differences between our subject 
pools, we will also control in the data analysis for the socio-demographic characteristics of subjects 
                                                 
4 SA8000 is a global social accountability standard for decent working conditions. The standard is based on the principles 
of international human rights and conventions of the International Labour Organisation (ILO), which encourage 
management to implement sustainable systemic changes in business operations. SA8000 aims to improve the work 
conditions in organizations; the standard governs child or forced labor, health and safety, freedom of association and right 
to collective bargaining, discrimination, disciplinary practices, work hours, compensation, and management system. 
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(especially, those which were significantly different across the three samples) in order to ensure that our 
results are not due to differences between the characteristics of the three populations. 5 
3. Experimental Design 
The experiment is composed of two stages: A classification stage and a main stage. In the 
classification stage, subjects are required to perform three tasks which are widely employed in the 
experimental literature to study other-regarding preferences. The subjects first play a one-shot Dictator 
Game, then they play a Public Good Game to assess their conditional willingness to contribute to a public 
good (Strategy Method) and finally they play a Decomposed Game. In the main stage, subjects play a 
repeated anonymous linear Public Good Game (12 repetitions). The experiment was incentivized and 
fully computerized with the software z-Tree [29]. Anonymity was guaranteed both during the game and 
the payment procedures. 
In the one-shot Dictator Game, each subject is randomly matched with another individual, and has to 
decide how to divide an endowment of 300 experimental tokens between herself and her matched 
subject. After each subject has made her decision, a random mechanism establishes whether her proposal 
or the proposal of the counterpart is implemented. This game provides a measure of fair behavior for 
each participant. Subjects who give less than 100 tokens are classified as self-centered, while those who 
give 100 or more are classified as beneficent (for a similar classification, see [17]). 
In the second task, subjects are classified according to their behavior in a linear one-shot Public Good 
Game using the Strategy Method Technique [30,31]. Subjects are randomly allocated to groups of four 
individuals. An endowment of 200 tokens is to be allocated by each subject between a “private” and a 
“public” account. The individual payoff is determined according to the following function: 




where ݃௜ is player i’s contribution to the public account and ݃௝ the contribution by the other members 
of the group. Since the contributions of the group to the public account are doubled and equally divided 
among the group participants, the marginal individual benefit from contributing to the public good is 0.5. 
Subjects are first asked to make an unconditional contribution to the public good, and then to indicate 
their willingness to contribute to the public account, conditional upon different possible contributions of 
the other group members. The possible average contributions range from 0–200, and are listed as 
multiples of 10 tokens. After the choices are made, one subject per each group is randomly selected and 
paid according to her conditional contribution to the unconditional contributions of the other three 
members. The remaining players are paid according to their unconditional contributions. This task 
provides a measure of subjects’ cooperativeness. 
In the third classification task, we employ a Decomposed Game Technique, a classificatory task used 
both in the economic and psychological literature to study the distributional preferences of subjects  
(e.g., [17,18,31–33]). Participants are asked to choose between two possible allocations of money.  
                                                 
5 Our subjects, and particularly workers, may differ on many other important dimensions (e.g., income, wealth, type of job) 
for which we do not have information. This limits the possibility to conduct a proper comparison especially between 
temporary and permanent workers. 
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For example, a subject must choose whether she prefers an allocation where she receives 130 tokens and 
the other participant receives 75 tokens, or an allocation where she receives 145 tokens and the other 
participants loses 39 tokens. Subjects are randomly and anonymously matched in couples and asked to 
make 24 choices between pairs of allocations. The individual earnings are equal to the sum of the payoffs 
of the 24 choices made by the subject and by her co-participant, who remains the same throughout the 
24 choices (for more details, see [17,18,31]). 
No feedback about the co-participants’ choices is provided to the subjects during the classification 
stage: The subjects only receive information about their earnings at the end of the experiment. In 
addition, the order of the classification tasks is the same for all the subjects, and, therefore, it cannot 
explain possible across-sample differences. 
After the classification stage, the subjects enter the main stage of the experiment and play a repeated 
linear 4-player Public Good Game (12 rounds). At the beginning of the first round, subjects are randomly 
matched in groups of four which remain the same over all rounds. The payoff function is identical to the 
one used in the Strategy Method, except for the individual endowment (20 tokens instead of 200 tokens). 
At the end of each round, each subject receives feedback about her contribution to the group account, 
the single contributions of the other members (whose identities are hidden), 6 and her total earnings. 
Comprehension and familiarity with the experimental setup is obtained by requiring subjects to enter 
three forced inputs. 7 After the first 12 rounds, the subjects engage in additional experimental tasks which 
we do not consider in this paper. 8 After all tasks are completed, subjects are informed about their 
earnings and are required to complete a demographic questionnaire (reported in the Appendix). 
The experiment was conducted at the LES (Laboratorio di Economia Sperimentale, Forlì campus of 
the University of Bologna, Italy) and at the BLESS (Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in Social 
Science, Bologna campus of the University of Bologna, Italy) in the period July 2009–January 2011 
(details about dates and places of each session are in the Appendix). We ran a total of 18 sessions, with 
either 12 or 24 subjects per session. Each session was composed by homogeneous subject pools, for a 
total of 72 temporary workers, 84 permanent workers and 96 students, none of which had previously 
participated in a similar experiment. No subject could participate in more than one session. The 
participants were randomly assigned to computer terminals, which were separated by partitions in order 
to avoid facial or verbal communication between subjects. Before proceeding with each task, subjects 
                                                 
6 The order in which the contributions of the other members is displayed is randomized in each round. 
7 As shown in [34], in a Public Good Game, on-screen instructions requiring forced inputs improve on subjects’ comprehension 
and familiarity with the experimental task. They also contribute to reduce both decision and waiting times without affecting 
the overall pattern of contributions. 
8 The additional tasks consist of 24 additional rounds of the Public Good Game with some design changes with respect to 
the initial 12 rounds, and a Stag Hunt Game with framed instructions. Since the subjects were not informed about the 
content of the future tasks, no distortion in their choices was artificially introduced by the experimenters. To very briefly 
summarize the findings of these additional tasks, the contributions of permanent and temporary workers remain high all 
over the 24 additional rounds, whereas the contributions of students drop dramatically after restarting the Public Good 
Game. This pattern is consistent with the first 12 rounds of the Public Good Game reported in the main text. In the Stag 
Hunt Game, permanent and temporary workers display very similar behaviors, while students are less likely to cooperate 
compared to both permanent and temporary workers. More details about these additional tasks are available from the 
authors upon request. 
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filled in a control questionnaire designed to check their understanding of the instructions. Clarifications 
were individually given to subjects who answered incorrectly. The experiment used a fictional currency, 
with one token being equal to one euro cent. The exchange rate was not differentiated among the three 
pools. 9 At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid for all tasks, on top of a show-up fee of €2. On 
average, subjects earned €20.93 (approximately 28 US dollars). To secure anonymity in the lab, 
assistants paid the participants privately at their desks. Each session lasted on average 2 h, including 
instructions and check questions to verify the understanding of the rules by the participants. The 
experimental instructions were as neutral as possible, and made available both on screen and on paper 
at the beginning of each experimental task. To ensure common knowledge, instructions were also read 
out aloud by the experimenter. 
4. Results 
In this section, we report the results of the classification tasks (Dictator Game, Public Good Game with 
Strategy Method and Decomposed Game Technique) and of the repeated linear Public Good Game. 10 
4.1. Dictator Game 
Following [17], we classify subjects as beneficent when they donate one third or more of their 
endowment to the other player, and we classify them as self-centered otherwise. The results are reported 
in Table 1. 
Table 1. Beneficent and self-centered subjects in the Dictator Game. 
 Temporary Permanent Student Total 
Number of subjects 72 84 96 252 
Average offer 40% (121) 45% (135) 23% (70) 35% (106) 
Self-centered 25% (n = 18) 14.3% (n = 12) 55.2% (n = 53) 32.9% (n = 83)
Beneficent 75% (n = 54) 85.7% (n = 72) 44.8% (n = 43) 67.1% (n = 169)
We can reject the hypothesis that being beneficent is independent of whether a subject is a temporary 
worker, a permanent worker or a student (Chi-squared test, p < 0.001). 11 The proportion of beneficent 
subjects among temporary and permanent workers is significantly larger than among students  
(Chi-squared test, p < 0.001). In comparison with the literature, note that the share of beneficent subjects 
among our undergraduate students is lower than the one found in [17], where the majority of subjects 
(61%, i.e., 43 out of 71) was classified as beneficent. However, the average offer by students is in line 
                                                 
9 In the literature, two different approaches have been adopted for paying subjects belonging to different pools. One 
approach uses incentives which are proportional to the respective outside options, which could imply higher payments for 
workers and lower ones for students. Another approach (see, e.g., [4]) uses the same incentives and exchange rate, arguing 
that doing otherwise would introduce confounders. The distinction between the two approaches is relevant when the 
outside options are significantly different. In our experiment, however, the workers’ hourly wage is about 10 euros, which 
is close to the average hourly monetary payoff our laboratory generally pays to students subjects. 
10 In this section we distinguish between permanent and temporary workers. In the Appendix B we show that similar results 
hold if we pool the two samples together. 
11 Throughout the paper, bivariate tests are two-tailed. 
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with the literature (see, e.g., [35]). Although beneficent subjects are more common among the permanent 
workers than among the temporary workers, the difference is only weakly significant (Chi-squared test, 
p = 0.091) and disappears once we control for other covariates (see next paragraph on the regression 
analysis). 12 This allows stating the following: 
Result 1: In the Dictator Game student are less beneficent than workers. Temporary and permanent 
workers do not differ. 
Table 2 reports the results from the regression analysis. Regression 1 is a Tobit regression where the 
dependent variable is the amount offered in the Dictator Game; Regression 2 is a Probit regression on 
the likelihood of being a beneficent subject. In both regressions the explanatory variables include age 
and dummies identifying the experimental sample (using temporary workers as baseline category), 
gender (Male = 1 for male subjects), marital status (Married = 1 for married subjects), religious affiliation 
(NoReligion = 1 for atheist or agnostic subjects), and educational background (Degree = 1 for subjects 
with a university degree). 13 
Table 2. Regression analysis (Dictator Game). 
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 
β Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Student −53.557 *** 12.35 0 −0.181 *** 0.06 0.005 
Permanent 3.082 15.77 0.845 0.037 0.09 0.684 
Male 4.264 11.3 0.706 −0.020 0.06 0.725 
Married 5.092 12.75 0.69 0.028 0.09 0.748 
NoReligion −21.08 12.99 0.106 −0.059 0.07 0.379 
Degree 10.108 11.08 0.363 0.042 0.06 0.478 
Age 0.945 0.64 0.144 0.009 ** 0.00 0.031 
Constant 86.641 *** 22.18 0    
Obs 252   252   
Pseudo R2 0.021 a   0.141   
Prob > F 0.000   0.000   
Notes: Regression 1: Tobit regression with robust standard errors, the dependent variable is the offer in the 
Dictator Game; Regression 2: Probit regression with robust standard errors on the likelihood of being a 
beneficent (in the table, we report the average marginal effects of the independent variables). a This is the 
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. Obs = observations. Prob > F = p-value of F-test. dy/dx = marginal effects.  
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
We detect a significant effect of age in Regression 2. In particular, older subjects are more likely to 
be beneficent than younger. Once we control for the individual characteristics, the regression analysis is 
consistent with Result 1. 
                                                 
12 In the Appendix we show that similar results hold when considering the distribution of offers. 
13 Throughout the paper, in the regression analysis we control for socio-demographic characteristics (see the Appendix). We 
also ran regressions without including the individual characteristics of the subjects among the explanatory variables. The 
results qualitatively replicate those reported in the paper and are available upon request. 
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4.2. Public Good Game with Strategy Method 
Using the Strategy Method, subjects are classified in six categories depending on their conditional 
contributions in the Public Good Game. Similar to [30] we classify as Conditional Cooperators those 
subjects that display a significant monotonically increasing pattern between their conditional contribution 
and the average contribution of the other group members (Spearman rank correlation ρ > 0, p < 0.01); as 
Free Riders those who always contribute zero, and as Triangle contributors those who display a 
significant monotonically increasing pattern up to a maximum (Spearman ρ > 0, p < 0.01) and a 
significant monotonically decreasing pattern after that maximum (Spearman ρ < 0, p < 0.01). We also 
add two categories. Subjects who contribute a positive amount irrespective of the others’ contributions 
are classified as Unconditional Cooperators, whereas subjects who display a significant monotonically 
decreasing pattern (Spearman ρ < 0, p < 0.01) are classified as Compensators, as they seem to 
counterbalance low contributions by the others. All remaining subjects are pooled in a residual category 
called Others. In Figure 1, we report the average contribution of each type of subject, conditional on the 
average contribution of the other group members. 
 
Figure 1. Average contribution (Strategy method), all subjects (n = 252). 
Table 3 shows the frequencies of the different types of subjects in the three samples and in the whole 
data set. 
We find that the share of conditional cooperators is the largest in all the three samples, which suggests 
a general tendency to reciprocate and to conform to the choices of the other group members. When 
considering students, however, some differences deserve to be mentioned. The share of conditional 
cooperators among students is significantly higher than among permanent workers (Fisher’s exact test, 
p = 0.029). Moreover, the share of unconditional cooperators is the lowest among students (p = 0.040 
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when comparing with the permanent workers, and p = 0.012 with the temporary workers). 14 The finding 
that conditional cooperators are the largest share of the sample is consistent with [30], in which they 
report 50% of the sample (n = 44) to be conditionally cooperative, which is admittedly much lower than 
the results reported in Table 3. In our experiments, the remaining categories do not cover large shares of 
the population; in contrast Fischbacher et al. [30] find that 30% of their subjects behave as a free rider 
and 14% is a “triangular” subject (called “hump shaped” in their paper). A possible reason for these 
discrepancies may be due to the different payoff function, and in particular, to a public good multiplier 
equal to 0.4, instead of 0.5 as in our design. 
Table 3. Classification of types in the three samples (Strategy method). 
Type Temporary Permanent Student Total 
Conditional cooperator 70.8% (n = 51) 64.3% (n = 54) 78.1% (n = 75) 71.4% (n = 180)
Unconditional cooperator 9.7% (n = 7) 7.1% (n = 6) 1.0% (n = 1) 5.6% (n = 14) 
Free rider 1.4% (n = 1) 3.6% (n = 3) 5.2% (n = 5) 3.6% (n = 9) 
Triangular 1.4% (n = 1) 3.6% (n = 3) 2.1% (n = 2) 2.4% (n = 6) 
Compensator 5.6% (n = 4) 5.9% (n = 5) 2.1% (n = 2) 4.4% (n = 11) 
Others 11.1% (n = 8) 15.5% (n = 13) 11.5% (n = 11) 12.7% (n = 32)
Total 100% (n = 72) 100% (n = 84) 100% (n = 96) 100% (n = 252)
A priori we expected permanent workers to display a larger share of cooperators (either conditional 
or unconditional) with respect to temporary workers. Interestingly, this is not the case as the share of 
cooperators is not statistically different between the two samples of workers (p > 0.1). 
 
                                                 
14 In the experiment, we also elicited subjects’ beliefs about the average contributions by the other group members (see Table A3 
in the Appendix). Beliefs do not significantly differ across samples. Interestingly, the average contributions of both 
permanent and temporary workers are statistically higher than their beliefs about the contribution of the others (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test p < 0.001 for both), whereas contributions and beliefs of students do not statistically differ (Wilcoxon 
signed-rank test p = 0.609), which is consistent with the evidence that permanent and temporary workers are more likely 
to be unconditional cooperators compared to students. A Tobit regression where the dependent variable is the 
unconditional contribution and the set of regressors includes the individual beliefs shows that individual contributions are 
positively related to the individual beliefs about the contribution of others. The results of the Tobit regression are reported 
in the Appendix (Table A4). 
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Table 4. Multinomial logit (Strategy method). 
 
Compensator Conditional Free Rider Triangular Unconditional 
dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Student −0.021 0.04 0.554 0.091 0.09 0.292 0.010 0.03 0.768 0.005 0.03 0.878 −0.109 * 0.06 0.077 
Permanent −0.022 0.03 0.499 −0.113 0.08 0.165 0.099 ** 0.05 0.028 0.028 0.03 0.287 −0.020 0.04 0.636 
Male −0.006 0.02 0.797 −0.051 0.06 0.386 0.015 0.02 0.542 0.020 0.02 0.396 0.010 0.03 0.748 
Married 0.065 * 0.03 0.051 0.341 *** 0.12 0.005 −0.388 *** 0.12 0.001 0.021 0.02 0.352 −0.030 0.03 0.357 
NoReligion 0.009 0.03 0.772 0.055 0.07 0.460 0.026 0.03 0.335 −0.011 0.02 0.666 −0.007 0.04 0.854 
Degree −0.016 0.04 0.644 −0.031 0.07 0.657 0.010 0.03 0.721 0.033 0.03 0.269 −0.045 0.04 0.264 
Age 0.000 0.00 0.902 0.003 0.00 0.509 −0.008 ** 0.00 0.019 −0.000 0.00 0.964 0.001 0.00 0.540 
Obs 252 
Pseudo R2 0.088 
Prob > F <0.001 
Note: Multinomial logit regression with robust standard errors. The table reports the average marginal effects of the independent variables for each category of the dependent variable.  
Obs = observations. Prob > F = p-value of F-test. dy/dx = marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Result 2: The shares of conditional and unconditional cooperators do not differ among temporary 
and permanent workers. 
We also ran a multinomial logit regression where the dependent variable is the strategy method 
classification and where we control for the socio-demographic characteristics of the subjects. 15 For 
certain categories the sample size is very small, and, therefore, the results should be taken with care. In 
Table 4, we report the average marginal effects of the independent variables for each classification 
category. Compared to temporary workers, students are less likely to be unconditional co-operators, 
while permanent workers are more likely to be free riders. Interestingly, married people are more likely 
to be conditional cooperators and less likely to be free riders. Consistent with the literature, we also 
detect an effect of age whereby older subjects are less likely to be free-riders, although the effect is small 
in magnitude. 
4.3. Decomposed Game Technique 
The Decomposed Game Technique allows classifying subjects in five categories (Aggressive, 
Competitive, Individualistic, Reciprocating and Cooperative) depending on their choices across  
24 pairs of allocations. To classify subjects, we consider the total amount of tokens x each person 
allocated to herself in the 24 choices, and the total amount of tokens y she allocated to her partner. The 
classification depends on a measure, called the motivational vector that is calculated as the inverse 
tangent of the ratio y/x (see [36,37]). Geometrically, this measure represents the slope of the line passing 
for the origin and the point (x, y). Subjects are classified as Aggressive if the motivational vector has a 
slope between −112.5 and −67.5 degrees, Competitive if it is between −67.5 and −22.5, Individualistic 
if between −22.5 and 22.5, Reciprocating if between 22.5 and 67.5, and Cooperative if between  
67.5 and 112.5. Finally, subjects are classified as Others if the length of their vector is less than 75  
(see [17,18]). 16 
The results of this classification are reported in Table 5. Comparing the proportion of each type of 
subject across the three samples, the share of Competitive, Cooperative, Reciprocating and 
Individualistic subjects statistically differ across the three samples (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.039, 0.038, 
0.071, and 0.000, respectively). 
Two categories collect more than 75% of the subjects in each sample: Individualistic and 
Reciprocating. Considering these two categories, the shares are unbalanced, as there are more 
Reciprocating subjects among permanent workers and more Individualistic subjects among students. 
Comparing permanent workers and students, the difference in the share of Individualistic subjects is 
statistically significant (Fisher’s exact test, p < 0.001), while comparing permanent and temporary 
workers the share of Individualistic subjects is lower among the former category, although the difference 
is only weakly significant (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.088). When comparing students and temporary 
                                                 
15 We also tried a multinomial probit regression but it does not achieve convergence due to the fact that we have very few 
cases for certain categories. 
16 The list of choices and the graphical representation of the motivational vector are reported in the Appendix. The 
terminology used to label the behavioral types is like in [18,34]. 
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workers, the share of Individualistic subjects is higher among students, although the difference is only 
weakly significant (Fisher’s one sided test, p = 0.080). 
Table 5. Distribution of types in the three samples. 
Type Temporary Permanent Student Total 
Aggressive 0% (n = 0) 1.2% (n = 1) 2.0% (n = 2) 1.2% (n = 3) 
Competitive 4.2% (n = 3) 10.7% (n = 9) 2.0% (n = 2) 5.6% (n = 14) 
Cooperative 2.8% (n = 2) 5.9% (n = 5) 0% (n = 0) 2.8% (n = 7) 
Individualistic 41.7% (n = 30) 22.6% (n = 19) 55.2% (n = 53) 40.5% (n = 102) 
Reciprocating 44.4% (n = 32) 54.8% (n = 46) 37.5% (n = 36) 45.2% (n = 114) 
Others 6.9% (n = 5) 4.8% (n = 4) 3.1% (n = 3) 4.8% (n = 12) 
Total 100% (n = 72) 100% (n = 84) 100% (n = 96) 100% (n = 252) 
Focusing on the students’ pool, our results are compatible with those reported in [17], who finds that 
Individualistic people are the majority (59.9% of her sample) and Reciprocating (which in her taxonomy 
are called “cooperative”) is the second largest category (37.3%). 
We can also check whether the information on distributional and motivational characteristics is 
consistent among the different classification tasks employed in the experiment. Overall, there is a good 
degree of consistency although correlations are not perfect. For example, being classified as Beneficent 
in the Dictator Game is positively correlated to being classified as Reciprocating (Spearman ρ = 0.268), 17 
and negatively related to being classified as Individualistic (ρ = −0.282) or as a Free rider (ρ = −0.318) 
in the Decomposed Game. Being classified as a Beneficent in the Dictator Game is also negatively 
correlated to being a Free Rider (ρ = −0.138) in the Strategy Method. Considering each group separately, 
we observe additional differences. In the permanent workers sample, being classified as Reciprocating 
in the Decomposed Game is negatively related to being classified as Free rider (ρ = −0.239) in the 
Strategy Method. Interestingly, being classified as an Individualistic in the Decomposed Game is  
also positively related to being classified as Free rider (ρ = 0.265) in the Strategy Method. In the 
temporary workers sample, instead, correlations between the different classifications are not significant 
at the 5% level. 
We also ran a multinomial logit regression where the dependent variable is the Decomposed  
Game Technique classification and where we control for the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
subjects. 18 For certain categories the sample size is very small, and, therefore, the results should be 
interpreted with caution. Table 6 reports the marginal effects, for each category of subjects, of this 
regression. The results confirm that workers are more likely to be cooperative compared to students. 
 
                                                 
17 We report the correlations that are statistically significant at 5% level. The interpretation of some of these correlations 
should be taken with caution since, for certain categories, we have very few observations. 
18 We also tried a multinomial probit regression but it does not achieve convergence due to the fact that we have very few 
cases for certain categories. 
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Table 6. Multinomial logit (Decomposed). 
 
Aggressive Competitive Cooperative Individualistic Reciprocating 
dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Student 0.185 * 0.11 0.090 −0.034 0.06 0.582 −0.369 *** 0.13 0.006 0.117 0.10 0.243 0.092 0.12 0.437 
Permanent 0.195 * 0.12 0.092 0.054 0.05 0.231 0.009 0.02 0.590 −0.246 ** 0.11 0.021 0.035 0.10 0.730 
Male −0.182 * 0.11 0.089 −0.045 0.04 0.259 0.035 * 0.02 0.060 0.096 0.08 0.231 0.107 0.08 0.160 
Married −0.184 * 0.11 0.093 0.018 0.04 0.610 −0.023 0.02 0.276 0.074 0.10 0.466 0.103 0.10 0.292 
NoReligion −0.179 * 0.11 0.089 −0.004 0.05 0.948 −0.375 *** 0.13 0.004 0.185 * 0.10 0.055 0.345 *** 0.11 0.002 
Degree 0.014 0.01 0.305 0.008 0.03 0.793 0.004 0.02 0.865 0.073 0.07 0.268 −0.062 0.07 0.395 
Age −0.001 0.00 0.297 −0.002 0.00 0.337 0.002 ** 0.00 0.044 −0.001 0.00 0.777 0.000 0.00 0.924 
Obs 252 
Pseudo R2 0.101 
Prob > F <0.001 
Note: Multinomial logit regression with robust standard errors. The table reports the average marginal effects of the independent variables for each category of the dependent variable.  
Obs = observations. Prob > F = p-value of F-test. dy/dx = marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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4.4. Linear Public Good Game 
The classification tasks reveal that the shares of Unconditional cooperators, Conditional cooperators 
and Free riders differ among the three samples. In a repeated strategic game this allows making some 
predictions on the behavior of the subjects, since in the presence of conditional cooperators, feedback 
on the others participants choices and own earnings should induce adaptation to the behavior of other 
players and, possibly, learning. In particular, since there is a higher share of Unconditional cooperators 
among the permanent and temporary workers, as well as a lower share of Free riders, we would expect 
higher initial levels of contributions in the samples of workers than in the sample of students. 
Furthermore, we would expect Conditional cooperators to provide high levels of contribution in the 
subsequent rounds. In contrast, since in the student sample there is a higher share of Free riders, we 
would expect lower initial contributions, which in turn should induce Conditional cooperators to lower 
their contributions over time. 
Figure 2 shows the average contribution in the first 12 rounds of the Linear Public Good Game for 
each subject pool (students, permanent workers, and temporary workers). In Figure 3 we pool workers 
to highlight the differences between workers and students. Initial contributions do not differ significantly, 
although we can observe some differences as the game unravels. In the students’ sample, average 
contributions per round and total average contributions are below those by permanent and temporary 
workers. Comparing the contributions across the three samples for each round, 19  we reject the 
hypothesis that the three samples come from the same population only for the last two rounds (Kruskal 
Wallis test, p = 0.084 and 0.026, respectively). Students contributed significantly less in the last rounds 
of the Public Good Game compared to permanent (round 10, 11, 12; Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.090, 
0.053, and 0.024, respectively) and temporary workers (round 11, 12; p = 0.069, and 0.020, respectively), 
but we do not detect any significant difference in the average contribution of permanent and temporary 
workers (p > 0.1). The students’ contributions significantly decrease over time (Spearman ρ = −0.192,  
p < 0.001). This is a recurrent finding in the literature (see, e.g., [15,16,35]). Interestingly, there is no 
significant downward trend for temporary and permanent workers (Spearman ρ = −0.016 and −0.060,  
p = 0.820 and 0.343), with an average contribution that remains quite constant throughout the 12 rounds 
of the Public Good Game. Hence, we can state the following: 
Result 3: Students contribute less than workers and their contributions decrease over time. 
Temporary and permanent workers contribute on average more than 70% of their endowment and their 
contributions remain stable over time. 
To study how contributions depend on the history of the game, we employ a Poisson-logit  
maximum-likelihood hurdle model to separate the decision of contributing in two steps (see, e.g., [38]). 
First, with a logit model we study whether the subjects decide to contribute or not, then with a  
zero-truncated Poisson model we study the decision about the amount of the contribution, conditional 
on contributing a positive amount. 
                                                 
19 We use the average of each Public Good Game group’s contribution as the unit of observation. 




Figure 2. Evolution of average contributions over time (students, permanent, and temporary workers). 
 
Figure 3. Evolution of average contributions over time (students vs. workers). 
Table 7 displays the results of this estimation. In a first model (Hurdle model 1), the independent 
variables are the sample dummies (the baseline category is “temporary”), a time variable, the positive 
and negative deviations of i’s contribution from the average group contribution in period t−1, the 
individual i’s contributions made in t−1 and t−2, and, as in previous regressions, the  
socio-demographic characteristics of the subjects. In a second model (Hurdle model 2), we also include 
the classification dummies obtained from the classification tasks. In particular, we consider being 
Individualistic, Competitive or Reciprocating in the Decomposed Game, Beneficent in the Dictator 
Game, and being Conditional, Unconditional or a Free rider in the Strategy Method. 
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Table 7. Poisson-logit maximum-likelihood hurdle model. 
Hurdle Model 1 
 
Decision to Contribute Decision of How Much to Contribute
dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Permanent −0.032 0.022 0.134 −0.459 * 0.266 0.085 
Student −0.043 ** 0.018 0.016 −0.085 0.264 0.749 
Contribution t−1 0.007 *** 0.001 0.000 0.738 *** 0.045 0.000 
Contribution t−2 0.003 *** 0.001 0.002 0.247 *** 0.027 0.000 
Positive deviation t−1 −0.015 *** 0.002 0.000 −0.305 *** 0.046 0.000 
Negative deviation t−1 −0.010 *** 0.002 0.000 0.521 *** 0.113 0.000 
Period −0.009 *** 0.002 0.000 −0.030 0.024 0.211 
Male −0.015 0.013 0.278 0.131 0.209 0.531 
Married 0.044 * 0.026 0.092 −0.030 0.241 0.899 
NoReligion −0.028 * 0.016 0.075 -0.086 0.256 0.738 
Degree 0.022 0.014 0.127 −0.640 *** 0.240 0.008 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.235 0.029 ** 0.013 0.024 
Obs 2520   2292   
Hurdle Model 2 
 
Decision to Contribute Decision of How Much to Contribute
dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Permanent −0.033 * 0.019 0.093 −0.369 0.286 0.197 
Student −0.034 * 0.017 0.052 −0.086 0.281 0.758 
Contribution t−1 0.007 *** 0.001 0.000 0.732 *** 0.045 0.000 
Contribution t−2 0.002 ** 0.001 0.013 0.245 *** 0.027 0.000 
Positive deviation t−1 −0.015 *** 0.002 0.000 −0.306 *** 0.046 0.000 
Negative deviation t−1 −0.009 *** 0.002 0.000 0.513 *** 0.113 0.000 
Period −0.009 *** 0.002 0.000 −0.031 0.024 0.202 
Male −0.017 0.012 0.171 0.107 0.214 0.618 
Married 0.033 0.024 0.167 −0.051 0.244 0.835 
NoReligion −0.016 0.014 0.274 −0.121 0.258 0.639 
Degree 0.008 0.014 0.535 −0.592 ** 0.242 0.015 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.453 0.028 ** 0.014 0.048 
Beneficent 0.026 * 0.013 0.054 0.023 0.256 0.929 
Reciprocating −0.110 ** 0.051 0.032 0.699 0.472 0.138 
Individualistic −0.115 ** 0.051 0.026 0.578 0.485 0.233 
Competitive −0.067 0.060 0.259 −0.165 0.686 0.810 
Conditional −0.005 0.017 0.774 0.062 0.259 0.812 
Free rider −0.091 *** 0.025 0.000 −0.866 1.147 0.450 
Unconditional −0.023 0.022 0.310 0.394 0.491 0.422 
Obs 2520   2292   
Notes: The decision to contribute is estimated with a logit model with clustered standard errors at individual 
level. The decision of how much to contribute is estimated with a zero-truncated Poisson model with clustered 
standard errors at individual level. In the table, we report the average marginal effects of the independent 
variables. Obs = observations. Prob > F = p-value of F-test. dy/dx = marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, 
*** p < 0.01. 
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The results of the estimation appear to be consistent with our expectations based on the shares of Free 
riders, Unconditional and Conditional co-operators detected in the classification task (in particular, in 
the Strategy Method). From the first model, we observe that students are less likely to contribute a 
positive amount compared to temporary and permanent workers. This result may be explained by the 
larger proportion of Free Riders and the smaller proportion of Unconditional contributors among 
students. Indeed, once we include the classification dummies in the regressions (Hurdle model 2), the 
point estimate for the variable students decreases and becomes only weakly significant, whereas the 
variable Free Rider is negative and strongly significant, suggesting that subjects who are classified as 
Free Riders in the Strategy Method are less likely to contribute to the public good. 20 In both the first 
and second models, we also find that the probability of not contributing to the public good significantly 
increases across periods, and it increases if the subject’s contribution in the previous period had not 
matched the average contribution of her group. There is also evidence that subjects are more likely to 
contribute a positive amount the higher their contribution in the previous rounds (this effect is small, but 
highly significant). 21  When considering the decision of how much to contribute (conditional on 
contributing a positive amount), in both models we observe that current contributions are positively 
correlated to past contributions, and they increase if the subject’s contribution in the previous period was 
smaller than the average contribution of the group. Furthermore, subjects who contributed above the 
average in the previous period adjust their decision and reduce their contribution in the current round, 
and older and more educated subjects contribute more than younger subjects. Finally, in the first model 
we also have some weakly significant evidence that, conditional on contributing a positive amount, 
permanent workers contribute less than temporary workers. 
5. Discussion 
In this paper, we investigate two main research questions. First, we study whether we can detect 
differences in behavior and social preferences between undergraduate students and workers. Second, 
focusing on the sample of workers, we investigate whether temporary contract and permanent  
contract workers behave similarly, or whether the type of contractual arrangement is correlated with 
observable differences. 
With respect to the first research question, we find that students tend to be more self-oriented, and 
less willing to cooperate in a public good game. This result is consistent with similar findings in the 
literature (for a recent review and a methodological discussion see, e.g., [39]). For instance, using a 
public good game, Gächter and Herrmann [40] show that students are less prosocial than rural and urban 
citizens, and Cardenas [41] shows that they extract more resources than rural villagers in a common pool 
resources experiment. Similar findings are observed when comparing students with workers, such as 
nurses [5], bicycle messengers [8], shrimp fishermen [13], and white-collar workers [42]. Previous studies 
suggest that students seem to be at the lower bound of other-regarding preferences. In this paper, we 
                                                 
20 There is also some weakly significant evidence that Reciprocating and Individualistic subjects are less likely to contribute, 
whereas Beneficent subjects are more likely to contribute. 
21 In the first model, we also find that married subjects are more likely to contribute to the public good, and that atheist or 
agnostic subjects are less likely to contribute, although these estimates are only weakly significant. 
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confirm this finding, thereby contributing a little further to the robustness of the results presented in the 
literature using undergraduate subjects. 
Also, we find that there are marked differences between students and workers in the patterns of 
contributions in the repeated public good game, which suggests that different preferences translate in 
substantial differences in behavior in strategic settings. The reasons for the observed differences between 
students and non-students can be attributed to a variety of reasons. For example, in a field study, List [2] 
suggests that age might play a crucial role, since he finds that younger and middle-aged subjects tend to 
contribute to a public good at rates consistent with extant laboratory data, whereas older subjects 
contribute larger amounts of their endowment. Similarly, cooperation rates in prisoner’s dilemma games 
are greater among older than among younger subjects. The existing experiments contrasting students 
and workers also suggest that the exposition to a working environment might endogenously affect the 
propensity to cooperate. Which factors lead workers to be more cooperative or to become more 
opportunistic may in principle depend on several reasons, including the work climate, the type of job, 
the type of employee or the type of contractual arrangement. 
Before running the experiment to address the second research question, we expected to find a 
significantly lower propensity to cooperate in the group of temporary workers with respect to the group 
of permanent (co-op) workers, as the former are less likely to know each other and they have received 
no specific training on the values of cooperation and mutualism. In addition, in terms of social distance 
co-op permanent workers are closer to each other than temporary workers [43]. The experimental results 
show, instead, that temporary and permanent workers contribute substantially and in a very similar way 
to the public good over the 12 rounds of the game. This result holds even if temporary workers tend to 
be slightly more individualistic than permanent workers. 
This finding is suggestive and it deserves a deeper discussion, with the caveat that our study has some 
limitations. In particular, due to the difficulties in recruiting workers as experimental subjects and to the 
data availability, we cannot provide clean comparisons between the two categories of workers. Taking 
into account these limitations, we can still make some conjectures on the reasons why the two samples 
do not differ as much as expected. A possible explanation for the results in the Public Good Game relies 
on the large proportion of Unconditional contributors in both the temporary and permanent workers 
samples (and, analogously, on the low proportion of Free Riders). This may have helped a sustained 
high level of cooperation for Conditional contributors, thereby maintaining high average contribution 
rates. In contrast, the higher share of Free Riders among students might have induced Conditional 
cooperators to lower their contributions over time in response to the low contributions of Free Riders. 
This interpretation is consistent with the results shown in Table 7, which allows joining and comparing 
the information on the distributional preferences of the subjects obtained in the Classification stage of 
the experiment with the Strategic behavior observed in the repeated Public Good Game. 
A second possible explanation is that workers, irrespective of whether they are employed under a 
temporary or permanent contract, are less selfish than students. This explanation would suggest that 
socialization processes due to working experiences and age could be major factors. If workers have 
learnt that cooperating provides long-run benefits, they may have brought this experience into the lab 
and use it when contributing in the Public Good Game. Students, instead, are more used to individual 
rather than team work and have less experience with repeated interactions and the related reputational 
concerns. Moreover, students participating in lab experiments may be a selected population with a 
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stronger focus on earning money [31]. Unfortunately, our design does not allow disentangling this kind 
of selection issues. 22 
Subjects only knew that the pools were homogeneous. This might have induced an in-group bias. For 
example, temporary workers may have chosen their contributions based on mutual insurance 
considerations. Accordingly, they might have contributed to the public good knowing that the other 
group members were also temporary workers, and this may have stimulated high contributions. 
However, this effect should be stronger among the permanent workers, as they work for the same 
cooperative and meet each other daily, but we detect no significant difference with respect to temporary 
workers. This result shows that temporary and permanent arrangements do not affect the propensity to 
cooperate to a public good when workers are part of a homogeneous group. As far as we know, this is 
the first experimental evidence showing this finding. A different, but related, question which we leave 
for future investigation is whether heterogeneous groups composed by both temporary and permanent 
workers display the same levels and trends of contributions. 
Our a priori expectation of a higher contribution rate among permanent workers was based on the 
fact that they know each other, that they work in the same place, and that the common employer is a  
co-op which actively emphasizes the values of mutualism and cooperation. It is however possible that 
some other factors may have driven the behavior of permanent workers toward an unexpected direction. 
Knowing each other is not a guarantee per se of a high social capital and willingness to cooperate, as 
human relationships can improve, but as well deteriorate over time. Analogously, being constantly 
exposed to the values of mutualism does not ensure these values are internalized by workers, since these 
values may possibly be rejected. If this were the case, we should observe low contribution rates. The 
result that the observed contribution rates of permanent workers are significantly higher than those of 
students and that they remain quite high over time (about 60% of the initial endowment), however, does 
not support this hypothesis. 
The high degree of cooperative and other-regarding behavior observed among temporary workers 
may be due to positive selection and signaling effects. As observed by Engellandt and Riphahn [24], 
temporarily employed workers may have below average risk-aversion and accept temporary jobs to 
signal their ability and qualify for permanent positions. In a similar fashion, social and labor 
psychologists refer to impression management, as the systematic attempt by temporary workers to 
behave in a way that pleases the employee [44]. Such an attitude might have been brought by the 
temporary workers into the lab, and push them to cooperate. Although this possibility cannot be excluded 
a priori, we made very clear that the participation to our experiment was a one-shot experience, and that 
in no way we would have communicated the results of their individual choices to the recruitment agency. 
It is possible that the common social environment in which both temporary and permanent workers 
live has played a major role for working people. The social environment can overwhelm the role of 
investments in the values of cooperation by the co-operative, or the possible differences induced by 
                                                 
22 Note that the above results cannot be due to demand effects nor to reputation effects, as we ensured anonymity and, if 
anything, we should expect this effect to operate in the same direction in all sessions. Similarly, it is unlikely that the 
results are due to a lack of understanding of the subjects or more systematic mistakes by temporary and permanent workers, 
since great care was taken to ensure subjects’ understanding of the instructions (for example, we included comprehension 
questionnaires at the end of the instructions, and we allowed plenty of time for individual clarifications). 
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permanent and temporary work arrangements. This can be the case, as the places where the experiments 
were conducted (located within the Emilia-Romagna region, Italy) are characterized by high levels of 
social capital and generalized trust [42]. This may have shaped in a similar way the behavior of both 
temporary and permanent workers, as well as that of the students raised in Emilia-Romagna. However, this 
conjecture is not consistent with the finding that students display significantly lower contribution rates 
even when controlling for age. Hence, if the reason for the scant difference in the contribution rates of 
temporary and permanent workers relies on the existence of a high social capital at the regional level, 
one should also explain why this seems to affect more workers than students. This requires additional 
data aimed at understanding whether our results also hold in regions where social capital is low. 23 
6. Conclusions 
Assessing the robustness of results obtained in a controlled environment using different subject pools 
is key for the evaluation of the external validity of experimental studies. We address this issue by running 
an artefactual field experiment using three different subject pools: undergraduate students, temporary 
contract workers, and permanent contract workers. 
The results obtained when contrasting students with workers are consistent with the findings available 
in the literature: students tend to be less prosocial than workers. We find, instead, only minor differences 
in the distributional preferences of the two groups of workers, and a very similar behavior in a Public 
Good Game. Workers, irrespective of the type of their contractual arrangement, begin with high levels 
of contribution to the public good, and contributions remain high over time. In the sample of students, 
instead, contributions begin at high levels, but then decline considerably over time. 
While the latter result is in line with the previous experimental evidence on the Public Good game, 
the high and steady level of contributions by workers is a less common finding. A possible explanation 
for this result is that the different contractual arrangements, and the consequent economic and 
psychological effects, play a minor role with respect to other factors. For example, socialization and 
learning on the job may have induced both temporary and permanent workers to behave similarly and 
avoid free-riding opportunities. Also, in-group and mutual insurance considerations may have driven 
workers to contribute to the public good. In either case, our paper documents that, in our sample of 
subjects, students cooperate less than workers, and that temporary and permanent workers cooperate at 
similar rates. This is a novel and somehow unexpected result which deserves further investigation. 
  
                                                 
23 Another possible explanation is that, contrary to our priors, co-op workers are not the only workers that had been exposed 
to the values of cooperation and mutualism. The recruiting agency which supplied the temporary workers was originally 
established as a co-op and, although it converted into a public limited company in 2003, it adheres to the Social 
Responsibility practices, it has an Ethical code and its guiding principles are (according to its Charter of Values) 
attentiveness, collaboration, improvement, equity, transparency, and integrity. We cannot exclude that these factors have 
had an influence on the preferences and behaviour of the temporary workers that took part in our experiment, but we do 
not think it has played a major role because there is very little interaction between the temporary workers and the staff of 
the recruiting agency, which is a simple intermediary between employers and workers. If anything, there may have been 
an interaction with the temporary employers, some of which also have Ethical codes and adhere to the Social 
Responsibility practices, while some others do not. 
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Appendix 
A. Participants, Sessions, and Additional Analysis 
A.1. Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Participants 
Table A1. Subjects’ socio-demographic characteristics. 
Characteristics Permanent Student Temporary 
Gender (n = 84) (n = 96) (n = 72) 
Female 58 (69.05%) 52 (54.17%) 43 (59.72%) 
Male 26 (30.95%) 44 (45.83%) 29 (40.28%) 
Age (n = 84) (n = 96) (n = 72) 
Mean 41.64 23.94 31.67 
St. dev. 9.19 4.57 9.39 
Marital Status (n = 84) (n = 96) (n = 72) 
Married 44 (52.38%) 1 (1.04%) 13 (18.06%) 
Unmarried 40 (47.62%) 95 (98.96%) 59 (81.94%) 
Nationality (n = 84) (n = 96) (n = 72) 
non-Italian a 7 (8.33%) 5 (5.21%) 8 (11.11%) 
Italian 77 (91.67%) 91 (94.79%) 64 (88.89%) 
Religion (n = 84) (n = 96) (n = 72) 
Agnostic/Atheist 9 (10.71%) 28 (29.17%) 15 (20.83%) 
Christian 71 (84.52%) 64 (66.67%) 42 (58.33%) 
Other b 4 (4.76%) 4 (4.17%) 15 (20.83%) 
Education (n = 84) (n = 96) (n = 72) 
Lower Secondary School or less 56 (66.67%) 95 (98.96%) 52 (72.22%) 
Upper Secondary School or more 27 (32.14%) 0 (0%) 14 (19.44%) 
Other 1 (1.19%) 1 (1.04%) 6 (8.33%) 
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Table A1. Cont. 
Characteristics Permanent Student Temporary 
Years of work (n = 36) c  (n = 72) 
Mean 19.42  10.22 
St. dev. 10.59  9.01 
Years of work in cooperative (n = 36) c   
Mean 10.01   
St. dev. 6.88   
Years of work as temporary   (n = 72) 
<1   41 (56.94%)
>1   31 (43.06%)
Working days as temporary worker (last 12 months)   (n = 72) 
Mean   46.04 
St. dev.   87.55 
Working days as temporary worker (total)   (n = 72) 
Mean   92.22 
St. dev.   189.96 
Months worked in cooperative   (n = 71) d 
Mean   14.2 
St. dev.   83.97 
Student status   (n = 72) 
Only worker   58 (80.56%)
Lower Secondary School or less   1 (1.39%) 
Upper Secondary School or more   11 (15.28%)
Other   2 (2.78%) 
Notes: a Seven were Albanian, 1 Brazilian, 2 Moldavian, 1 Polish, 5 Romanian, 2 Senegalese, 1 Serb, and  
1 Hungarian. b Two were Buddhist, 1 Indu, 6 Muslim, and 14 did not specify. c This information was collected 
only for a subset of permanent workers. d One subject did not specify how many months she worked  
in a cooperative. 
If we compare the proportion of males and females across the three samples, we do not detect any 
statistically significant difference (Chi-squared test, p = 0.122). In pairwise comparisons, the only 
statistically significant different occurs between permanent workers and students. In particular, the 
proportion of females is significantly lager in the permanent workers sample compared to the students 
sample (p = 0.041). There is no statistically significant difference in the proportion of females between 
temporary and permanent workers, and temporary workers and students (p = 0.224 and 0.472 
respectively). The three samples statistically significantly differ with respect to age (Kruskal Wallis test, 
p < 0.001). In particular, permanent workers are significantly older than students and temporary workers 
(Mann-Whitney p < 0.001 for both, pairwise comparison), and temporary workers are significantly older 
than students (p < 0.001). If we look at the marital status of the subjects, the three samples statistically 
significantly differ both in aggregate (Chi-squared test, p < 0.001) and in pairwise comparisons  
(p < 0.001). In particular, the proportion of permanent workers who are married is significantly larger 
than students and temporary workers. Similarly, the proportion of married subjects in the temporary 
workers sample is significantly larger than in the students’ sample. Almost the totality of the participants 
is Italian (92%). Only few subjects are not from Italy. Those who are not Italian are Albanian, Brazilian, 
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Moldavian, Polish, Romanian, Senegalese, Serb, or Hungarian. If we compare the proportion of  
non-Italian across the three samples, we do not detect any statistically significant difference (Chi-squared 
test, p = 0.370). A similar result is obtained in pairwise comparisons (p > 0.1). If we look at the religious 
affiliation, subjects statistically significantly differ in their religious beliefs across samples (Chi-squared 
test, p< 0.001). This evidence is also supported in pairwise comparisons (Chi-squared test, p < 0.01). 
More specifically, the fraction of Christians is larger among permanent workers than temporary workers 
and students. Students are generally more agnostic/atheist. The proportion of participants who are neither 
Christian nor agnostic/atheist is larger among temporary workers compared to students and permanent 
workers. In general, permanent workers are more religious than students (p = 0.002) and temporary 
workers (p = 0.081). In contrast, temporary workers are not statistically significantly more religious than 
students (p = 0.221). If we compare the level of education, the three samples statistically significantly 
differ (Chi-squared test, p < 0.001). In particular, a higher proportion of students possess a higher degree 
compared to permanent and temporary workers (Chi-squared test, p < 0.001). No statistically significant 
difference occurs between temporary and permanent workers on the level of education (Chi-squared test, 
p = 0.124). If we compare the years of work of permanent and temporary workers, permanent workers 
have more years than temporary workers (Mann-Whitney p < 0.001). 
A.2. Details of the Sessions 
Table A2. Details of the sessions. 
Session Sample Pool Number of Participants Date (Day/Month/Year) Location
1 Students 12 29/07/2009 Forli 
2 Students 12 29/07/2009 Forli 
3 Permanent workers 12 03/09/2009 Forli 
4 Permanent workers 12 03/09/2009 Forli 
5 Permanent workers 12 04/09/2009 Forli 
6 Students 24 14/04/2010 Forli 
7 Permanent workers 12 14/04/2010 Forli 
8 Permanent workers 12 16/04/2010 Forli 
9 Students 24 16/04/2010 Forli 
10 Permanent workers 12 16/04/2010 Forli 
11 Permanent workers 12 21/04/2010 Forli 
12 Students 12 24/02/2011 Forli 
13 Students 12 24/02/2011 Forli 
14 Temporary workers 12 24/02/2011 Bologna
15 Temporary workers 12 25/02/2011 Forli 
16 Temporary workers 12 25/02/2011 Forli 
17 Temporary workers 12 04/03/2011 Forli 
18 Temporary workers 12 25/03/2011 Bologna
19 Temporary workers 12 21/06/2011 Bologna
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A.3. Distribution of Offers in the Dictator Game 
Figure A1 shows the distribution of the offers per sample. Comparing the distributions of the offers 
between permanent workers and students, we reject the null hypothesis that they are the same  
(Epps-Singleton test, p < 0.001). A similar result holds when comparing temporary workers and students 
(Epp-Singleton test, p < 0.001). When we compare the sample distributions of the offers between 
temporary and permanent workers, we only weakly reject the hypothesis that they have been drawn from 
the same population (Epps-Singleton p = 0.077). 
 
Figure A1. Dictator Game: distribution of offers. 
A.4. Unconditional Contributions and Beliefs in the Strategy Method 
If we look at the unconditional contributions in the Strategy Method (Table A3), they weakly 
statistically differ across samples (Kruskal Wallis test, p = 0.061). In particular, if we conduct pairwise 
comparisons, students contributed on average less than permanent and temporary workers. However,  
the difference is statistically significant only when comparing students with permanent workers  
(Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.021). The beliefs do not significantly differ across samples, or in pairwise 
comparisons. Interestingly, the average contributions of both permanent and temporary workers are 
statistically higher than their beliefs about the contribution of the others (Wilcoxon signed-rank test,  
p < 0.001 and 0.001, respectively), whereas contributions and beliefs of students do not statistically 
differ (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p = 0.609). This result support the evidence that permanent and 
temporary workers are more likely to be unconditional co-operators compared to students, i.e., they 
contribute no matter what is the contribution of the others. 
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Table A3. Unconditional contributions and beliefs. 
Sample 
Contribution Belief 
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
Permanent (n = 84) 118.99 57.54 102.34 54.05 
Student (n = 96) 97.88 60.18 105.71 47.10 
Temporary (n = 72) 112.13 53.75 101.19 46.27 
Total (n = 252) 108.99 58.02 103.30 49.14 
We also ran a Tobit regression where the dependent variable is the unconditional contribution. 
Independent variables include dummy variables for the experimental sample (using the temporary 
workers as baseline category), age, gender (Male = 1 for male subjects), relationship status (Married = 1 
for married subjects), religious affiliation (NoReligion = 1 for atheist or agnostic subjects), educational 
background (Degree = 1 for subjects with a university degree), and beliefs. Table A4 displays the results 
of the regression. When covariates are controlled for, we observe that students contribute significantly 
less than temporary workers, whereas the unconditional contributions of permanent workers do no 
statistically differ from those of temporary workers. In addition, there is strong evidence that the 
contribution is positively related to the beliefs about the contribution of the others. This result does not 
surprise since about 70% of the subjects were classified as conditional co-operators. 
Table A4. Tobit regression (unconditional choice). 
 β Std. Err. p > z
Belief 0.991 *** 0.08 0.000
Student −20.937 ** 8.71 0.017
Permanent 6.864 9.05 0.449
Male −4.767 7.41 0.521
Married −12.099 9.11 0.185
NoReligion −9.649 9.24 0.298
Degree 8.562 7.95 0.282
Age 0.574 0.38 0.129
Constant 2.708 15.12 0.858
Obs 252   
ll −1113.4   
Prob > F 0   
Note: Tobit regression with robust standard errors. Obs = observations. Prob > F = p-value of F-test.  
ll = log-likelihood. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
A.5. Decomposed Prisoner’s Dilemma 
Table A5. Choice of allocations. 
Question
Option A Option B 
Self Other Self Other
1 150 0 145 39 
2 144 −39 130 −75 
3 130 −45 106 −106
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Table A5. Cont. 
Question 
Option A Option B 
Self Other Self Other
4 106 −106 75 −130
5 75 −130 39 −145
6 39 −145 0 −150
7 0 −150 −39 −145
8 −39 −145 −75 −130
9 −75 −130 −106 −106
10 −106 −106 −130 −75 
11 −130 −75 −145 −39 
12 −145 −39 −150 0 
13 −150 0 −145 39 
14 −145 39 −130 75 
15 −130 75 −106 106 
16 −106 106 −75 130 
17 −75 130 −39 145 
18 −39 145 0 50 
19 0 150 39 145 
20 39 145 75 130 
21 75 130 106 106 
22 106 106 130 75 
23 130 75 145 39 
24 145 39 150 0 
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A.6. Instructions 24 
Introduction 
Welcome to the Laboratory of Experimental Economics of the University of Bologna. 
You will participate in a study on individual behavior of about one hour and a half. If you read these 
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn some money. For your convenience, 
instructions are provided both on screen and on paper. 
Your earnings will be calculated in florins and will be converted into Euros at the end of today’s 
session. Every florin equals 1 euro cent. Payment will be made in cash at the end of this session and it 
will be done in such a way that no other participant will know how much you have earned. 
The experiment is divided into various stages. At each stage you will be asked to make some decisions 
or to answer a few simple questions. 
From now on it is forbidden to talk to the other participants, or communicate in any other way. If you 
want to ask a question, raise your hand. 
STAGE ONE 
Situation 
In this stage each of you is randomly matched with another participant. The identity of the participant 
with whom you are matched remains anonymous. You will never know with whom you are matched. 
For each pair of participants, the computer assigns 300 florins, which are randomly given to only one 
of the two members of the couple. The other participant gets nothing. 
Those who receive the 300 florins can decide whether to keep them all or give part of the florins to 
the other participant they are matched with. Those who have not received the 300 florins, instead, can 
only receive florins from their partner. 
You cannot currently know whether you are one of those who will receive the 300 florins, because 
those who will receive 300 florins will be randomly selected at the end of stage seven. 
What you should do in stage one 
At this stage we ask you to indicate how you would divide 300 florins between you and the other 
person, in case you are randomly selected to receive the 300 florins. If, at the end of stage seven, you 
actually receive the 300 florins, then your choice will be implemented. If, instead, your partner will be 
selected, her/his choice will be implemented, and you will receive the amount of florins indicated  
by her/him. 
Push the button “Continue” and make your choice. 
  
                                                 
24 Translation from Italian; bold, italics and other formatting options are as in the original version of the instructions. 





In this stage, each of you is randomly matched with three other participants to form a group of four 
persons. The identity of the other participants is anonymous and you will not know with whom you  
are matched. 
Each person receives 200 florins and must decide how many florins to put in her/his own personal 
account and how many to invest in a project. The overall payoff is given by the personal account plus 
the earnings resulting from the project. 
Earnings from the personal account: For each florin you put in your personal account you will earn 
exactly one florin. 
For example, if you put 200 florins in your personal account (and therefore you do not invest in the 
project), you will earn exactly 200 florins. If you put 60 florins in your personal account, you will earn 
60 florins. 
Earnings from the project: The earnings resulting from the project depend on your choices and the 
choices of the other members of the group. For each member of the group, the earnings from the project 
will be determined as follows: 
1) All florins given by the group members are summed up. 
2) The sum is doubled. 
3) The doubled sum is divided into four equal parts and assigned to each group member. 
Now let’s see two examples to better understand how the earnings from the project are calculated: 
Example 1: If the sum of all contributions to the project is 300 florins, each group member will 
receive individually: 
(300 florins multiplied by 2 and then divided by 4) = 150 florins from the project. 
Example 2: If the four members of the group invest 25 florins each, and then the sum of their 
investment is 100 florins, each group member will receive: 
(100 florins multiplied by 2 and then divided by 4) = 50 florins from the project. 
Practice in stage two 
Please answer the following questions. The purpose is to practice with the computation of the earnings 
you will get. The answers you give to these questions will not affect your final earnings. (If you like, 
you can use the electronic calculator that you can activate by pressing the small button at the bottom of 
the screen). 
1. Each member of the group has 200 florins at his disposal. Suppose that none of the four members 
of the group (including you) contributes to the project. 
• How much will your total earnings be (income + personal project)? 
• What will the individual earnings of the others members of the group be? 
2. Each member of the group has 200 florins at his disposal. Suppose you put 200 florins in the project 
and each of the other members of the group puts 200 florins. 
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• How much will your total earnings be (income + personal project)? 
Start of Stage Two 
Now the choice situation we have just described begins. You will be given 200 florins and you will 
decide how much you want to put in your personal account and how much in the project. The mechanism 
for calculating earnings is the one just described. 
What you should do in stage two 
In this stage you will make two kinds of choices: we will call the first “single choice” and the second 
“choice in the table”. Your earning in this stage depends both on what you have chosen in the “single 
choice”, and on what you have chosen in the “choice in the table”. 
Single Choice 
With the single choice you have to decide how many of the 200 florins you want to put in the project. 
You also have to indicate how much you think that others are investing in the project. If your guess 
is at 3 florins or closer from the actual average, you earn 3 extra florins. 
On your screen you will see this: 
 
After pressing the “OK” button, you will go to the “choice in the table”. 
Choice in the table: The screen for the “choice in the table” will look like this:  




For example, in the third cell of the first column you are asked to indicate how much you would like 
to contribute to the project if the average contribution of each of other members of your group is  
20 florins. Or, in the third cell of the second column you are asked to indicate how much you would like 
to contribute if each of the other group members contributes (on average) 130 florins.Results of stage 
two 
After all participants to the experiment have given their answers, the computer will randomly select 
a person in each group. 
The computer will take the choices made by the other 3 people in the “single choice” and it will 
compute the average of their contributions. Then it will consider what is the contribution choice indicated 
by the fourth person in the “choice in the table” in correspondence of the average contribution of the 
other three members. 
By combining this information, the computer: 
• Will compute the total contribution of the group by adding the three individual 
contributions (single choice) and the contribution given by the selected person (choice in 
the table); 
• Will determine the earnings from the project, by doubling the total amount of the 
contributions to the project; 
• Will give a quarter of the doubled sum to each member of the group. 
Since you do not know who will be selected by the computer to determine the choice in the table, 
when you have to fill in the single-choice and the choice in the table, you have to think carefully about 
both types of choice because both can prove to be decisive in the determination of your earnings. 
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The computer draw and the result of these computations will be communicated at the end of stage seven. 
Press the “Continue” button to begin.STAGE THREE 
Situation 
At this stage you have to choose between two options, Option A and Option B. The two options are 
related to sums of money that you and another participant will earn. For example, you may be asked to 
choose between two options, A and B, where Option A is a gain of 145 florins for you and a loss of  
39 florins for another participant, while Option B means a gain of 130 florins for you and a gain of  
75 for the other participant. The other participant will have to choose from the same options. An example 
of the choice between A and B is the following: 
 
There is a total of 24 pairs of choices, and you will be matched with the same participant (selected at 
random by the computer at the beginning of stage three) for all 24 pairs of choice. The identity of the 
other participant will remain anonymous, and no one will know who has been matched with. 
Your payoff depends on your choices and on those of the other participant, and it is given by the sum 
of the choices made by you and the other participant. 
Going on with the previous example, if you choose Option A (a gain of 145 florins for you, a loss of 
39 loss for your partner), and the other chooses Option B (a gain of 130 florins for her/himself and a 
gain of 75 florins for you), you will earn 145 + 75 = 220 florins, while the other participant will earn 
−39 + 130 = 91 florins. If, instead, also the other chooses Option A, you will earn 145 + 75 = 220 florins, 
while the other participant will earn −39 + 130 = 91 florins. If, instead, the other also choses Option A, 
you will earn 145 − 39 = 106. 
What you should do in stage three 
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In this stage we ask you to make 24 choices between Options A and B. The options will be different 
each time. 
Results 
The overall outcome of your choices will be known only at the end of stage seven. In any case, you 
will be paid privately and you will not know the identity of the other participant, nor she/he will  
know yours. 
Before starting with stage three, we ask you to answer some questions. The purpose is to practice 
with the computations of the earnings you will get. The answers you give to these questions will not 
affect your final earnings. 
In the situation described below: 
 
If both choose Option B 
How much do you earn? 
How much does the other participant earn? 
If you choose Option B, while the other participant chooses A 
How much do you earn? 
How much does the other participant earn? 
  





You will make choices similar to those of stage two, the one in which you received a sum of money and 
had to choose how much to invest in a common project and how much to put in your personal account. 
As before, the sum of money invested in the project is doubled and then divided among four 
anonymous participants, and your earnings will be the sum of these florins and of those that you put in 
your personal account. 
The participants in your group will be randomly selected by the computer from all the participants of 
this experiment and they will remain the same throughout this stage. 
Unlike before, every time you and the other three participants choose how much to invest in the 
project, the individual contributions will be immediately communicated to all participants in the group. 
To protect anonymity, the participants are indicated with letters A, B, C or D that the computer randomly 
assigns at each round. This means, for example, that letter A can indicate different people in the course 
of the stage. 
Along with your choice of contributing in the project, we will ask you what you think the others are 
contributing to the project, on average. If your prediction is at 3 or less florins from the actual average, 
you will earn three extra florins. 
What you should do in stage four 
This stage consists of 12 rounds. In each round you are given 20 florins and you are asked to choose 
how much to invest in the project (12 choices), and to indicate what you think is the average contribution 
of the other participants (12 forecasts). 
Results 
After you have made your choice and your prediction, you will be informed about the others’ 
contributions and how much you have earned. Payment will take place privately at the end of  
stage seven. 
B. Students vs. Workers 
In this Appendix we present the experimental results obtained by pooling temporary and  
permanent workers. 
B.1. Dictator Game 
Table A6. Beneficent and Self-centered subjects in the Dictator Game. 
 Worker Student Total 
Number of subjects 156 96 252 
Average offer 43% (128) 23% (70) 35% (106) 
Self-centered 19.2% (n = 30) 55.2% (n = 53) 32.9% (n = 83) 
Beneficent 80.8% (n = 126) 44.8% (n = 43) 67.1% (n = 169) 
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We can reject the hypothesis that being beneficent is independent of whether a subject is a worker or 
a student (Chi-squared test, p < 0.001). The proportion of beneficent subjects among workers is 
significantly larger than among students (Chi-squared test, p < 0.001). 
Table A7 reports the results from the regression analysis. Regression 1 is a Tobit regression where the 
dependent variable is the amount offered in the Dictator Game; Regression 2 is a Probit regression on the 
likelihood of being a beneficent subject. In both regressions the explanatory variables include age and 
dummies identifying the experimental sample (using workers as baseline category), gender (Male = 1 for 
male subjects), marital status (Married = 1 for married subjects), religious affiliation (NoReligion = 1 for 
atheist or agnostic subjects), and educational background (Degree = 1 for subjects with a university degree). 
B.2. Distribution of Offers in the Dictator Game 
Figure A3 shows the distribution of the offers per sample. Comparing the distributions of the offers 
between workers and students, we reject the null hypothesis that they are the same (Epps-Singleton test, 
p < 0.001). 
Table A7. Regression analysis (Dictator Game). 
 
Regression 1 Regression 2 
β Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Student −54.220 *** 12.64 0.000 −0.189 *** 0.06 0.003 
Male 4.039 11.11 0.717 −0.022 0.06 0.694 
Married 5.701 12.46 0.648 0.036 0.08 0.672 
NoReligion −21.204 12.91 0.102 −0.059 0.07 0.374 
Degree 9.822 10.89 0.368 0.039 0.06 0.502 
Age 0.996 * 0.52 0.058 0.009 *** 0.00 0.010 
Constant 86.345 *** 21.81 0.000    
Obs 252   252   
Pseudo R2 0.021 a   0.141   
Prob > F 0.000   0.000   
Notes: Regression 1: Tobit regression with robust standard errors, the dependent variable is the offer in the 
Dictator Game; Regression 2: Probit regression with robust standard errors on the likelihood of being a 
beneficent (in the table, we report the average marginal effects of the independent variables). a This is the 
McFadden’s pseudo R-squared. Obs = observations. Prob > F = p-value of F-test. dy/dx = marginal effects.  
* p < 0.1, *** p < 0.01. 




Figure A3. Dictator Game: Distribution of offers. 
B.3. Strategy Method 
Table A8. Classification of types in the three samples (Strategy method). 
Type Worker Student Total 
Conditional cooperator 67.31% (n = 105) 78.1% (n = 75) 71.4% (n = 180) 
Unconditional cooperator 8.33% (n = 13) 1.0% (n = 1) 5.6% (n = 14) 
Free rider 2.56% (n = 4) 5.2% (n = 5) 3.6% (n = 9) 
Triangular 2.56% (n = 4) 2.1% (n = 2) 2.4% (n = 6) 
Compensator 5.77% (n = 9) 2.1% (n = 2) 4.4% (n = 11) 
Others 13.46% (n = 21) 11.5% (n = 11) 12.7% (n = 32) 
Total 100% (n = 156) 100% (n = 96) 100% (n = 252) 
Students and workers significantly differ in the way subjects are classified according to the strategy 
method (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.059). The share of conditional cooperators among students is 
significantly higher than among workers (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.043). Moreover the share of 
unconditional cooperators is lower among students than workers (p = 0.010). 
We also ran a multinomial logit regression where the dependent variable is the strategy method 
classification and where we control for the socio-demographic characteristics of the subjects. 25 For 
certain categories the sample size is very small, and, therefore, the results should be taken with care. 
Table A9 reports the marginal effects, for each category of subjects, of this regression. The results 
confirm that workers are more likely to be unconditional co-operators compared to students. 
  
                                                 
25 We also tried a multinomial probit regression but it does not achieve convergence due to the fact that we have very few 
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B.4. Unconditional Contributions and Beliefs in the Strategy Method 
If we look at the unconditional contributions in the Strategy Method (Table A10), students contributed 
on average less than workers. However, the difference is statistically significant only when comparing 
students with permanent workers (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.026). The beliefs do not significantly differ 
between workers and students. 
Interestingly, the average contributions of workers are statistically higher than their beliefs about the 
contribution of the others (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p < 0.001), whereas contributions and beliefs of 
students do not statistically differ (Wilcoxon signed-rank test p = 0.609). This result support the evidence 
that workers are more likely to be unconditional co-operators compared to students, i.e., they contribute 
no matter what is the contribution of the others. 
We also ran a Tobit regression where the dependent variable is the unconditional contribution. 
Independent variables include dummy variables for students, age, gender (Male = 1 for male subjects), 
relationship status (Married = 1 for married subjects), religious affiliation (NoReligion = 1 for atheist or 
agnostic subjects), educational background (Degree = 1 for subjects with a university degree), and beliefs. 
Table A11 displays the results of the regression. When covariates are controlled for, we observe that 
Students contribute significantly less than workers. In addition, there is strong evidence that the 
contribution is positively related to the beliefs about the contribution of the others. This result does not 
surprise since about 70 % of the subjects were classified as conditional co-operators. 
B.5. Decomposed Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The results of this classification are reported in Table A12. Comparing the proportion of each type of 
subject between workers and students, the share of Competitive, Cooperative, Reciprocating and 
Individualistic subjects statistically differ between the two samples (Fisher’s exact test, p = 0.049, 0.033, 
0.068, and 0.000, respectively). 
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Table A9. Multinomial logit (Strategy method). 
 
Compensator Conditional Free Rider Others Triangular Unconditional 
dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Student −0.016 0.04 0.651 0.128 0.08 0.115 −0.024 0.03 0.369 0.020 0.05 0.701 −0.003 0.03 0.911 −0.105 * 0.06 0.089 
Male −0.005 0.02 0.826 −0.050 0.06 0.407 0.017 0.03 0.545 0.009 0.04 0.843 0.017 0.02 0.446 0.012 0.03 0.674 
Married 0.062 ** 0.03 0.044 0.353 *** 0.13 0.006 −0.410 *** 0.13 0.002 −0.002 0.06 0.974 0.025 0.02 0.299 −0.028 0.03 0.379 
NoReligion 0.011 0.03 0.734 0.051 0.08 0.497 0.029 0.03 0.271 −0.075 0.06 0.234 −0.011 0.02 0.665 −0.006 0.04 0.866 
Degree −0.015 0.03 0.671 −0.023 0.07 0.752 0.005 0.03 0.881 0.046 0.05 0.330 0.030 0.03 0.309 −0.043 0.04 0.285 
Age −0.000 0.00 0.850 0.000 0.00 0.949 −0.005 ** 0.00 0.043 0.004 0.00 0.120 0.000 0.00 0.681 0.001 0.00 0.625 
Obs 252 
Pseudo R2 0.070 
Prob > F <0.001 
Note: Multinomial logit regression with robust standard errors. The table reports the average marginal effects of the independent variables for each category of the dependent variable.  
Obs = observations. Prob > F = p-value of F-test. dy/dx = marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A10. Unconditional contributions and beliefs. 
Sample 
Contribution Belief 
Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. 
Worker (n = 156) 115.82 55.75 101.81 50.45 
Student (n = 96) 97.88 60.18 105.71 47.10 
Total (n = 252) 108.99 58.02 103.30 49.14 
Table A11. Tobit regression (unconditional choice). 
 β Std. Err. p > z
Belief 0.992 *** 0.08 0.000
Student −22.390 *** 8.52 0.009
Worker −5.362 7.28 0.462
Male −10.587 8.79 0.230
Married −9.910 9.16 0.281
NoReligion 7.958 7.89 0.314
Degree 0.681 * 0.36 0.062
Age 2.074 15.06 0.891
Constant 252   
Obs −1113.624   
ll 0   
Prob > F 0.992 *** 0.08 0.000
Note: Tobit regression with robust standard errors. Obs = observations. Prob > F = p-value of F-test.  
* p < 0.1, *** p < 0.01. 
Table A12. Distribution of types in the two samples. 
Type Worker Student Total 
Aggressive 0.64% (n = 1) 2.0% (n = 2) 1.2% (n = 3) 
Competitive 7.69% (n = 12) 2.0% (n = 2) 5.6% (n = 14) 
Cooperative 4.49% (n = 7) 0% (n = 0) 2.8% (n = 7) 
Individualistic 31.41% (n = 49) 55.2% (n = 53) 40.5% (n = 102) 
Reciprocating 50.00% (n = 78) 37.5% (n = 36) 45.2% (n = 114) 
Others 5.77% (n = 9) 3.1% (n = 3) 4.8% (n = 12) 
Total 100% (n = 156) 100% (n = 96) 100% (n = 252) 
Two categories collect more than 80% of the subjects in each sample: Individualistic and 
Reciprocating. Considering these two categories, the shares are unbalanced, as there are more 
Reciprocating subjects among workers and more Individualistic subjects among students. 
We also ran a multinomial logit regression where the dependent variable is the decomposed Prisoner’s 
Dilemma classification and where we control for the socio-demographic characteristics of the subjects. 26 
For certain categories the sample size is very small, and, therefore, the results should be taken with care. 
Table A13 reports the marginal effects, for each category of subjects, of this regression. The results 
confirm that workers are more likely to be unconditional co-operators compared to students. 
                                                 
26 We also tried a multinomial probit regression but it does not achieve convergence due to the fact that we have very few 
cases for certain categories. 
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B.6. Linear Public Good Game 
Figure A4 shows the average contribution in the first 12 rounds of the Linear Public Good Game. 
Initial contributions do not differ significantly, although we can observe some differences as the game 
unravels. In the Students sample, average contributions per round and total average contributions are 
significantly below those by workers (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.085). Comparing the contributions 
across the two samples for each round, 27 we reject the hypothesis that the two samples come from the 
same population only for the last three rounds (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.074, 0.027 and 0.007 
respectively). The students’ contributions significantly decrease over time (Spearman ρ = −0.192,  
p < 0.001), which is a recurrent finding in the literature (see, e.g., [15,16]). Interestingly, there is no 
significant downward trend for workers (Spearman ρ = −0.043, p = 0.357), with an average contribution 
that remains quite constant throughout the 12 rounds of the Public Good Game. 
 
Figure A4. Evolution of average contributions over time. 
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Table A13. Multinomial logit (Strategy method). 
 
Aggressive Competitive Cooperative Individualistic Others Reciprocating 
dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Student 0.017 0.01 0.134 −0.042 0.06 0.500 −0.369 *** 0.13 0.005 0.231 *** 0.09 0.007 0.026 0.04 0.505 0.137 0.11 0.212 
Male −0.188 * 0.11 0.082 −0.054 0.04 0.193 0.032 0.02 0.104 0.115 0.08 0.157 −0.006 0.03 0.817 0.102 0.08 0.178 
Married −0.185 * 0.11 0.089 0.028 0.04 0.442 −0.021 0.02 0.335 0.047 0.10 0.642 0.007 0.04 0.854 0.124 0.10 0.198 
NoReligion −0.183 * 0.11 0.081 −0.013 0.05 0.813 −0.374 *** 0.13 0.004 0.198 ** 0.10 0.044 0.035 0.04 0.323 0.336 *** 0.11 0.002 
Degree 0.009 0.01 0.466 −0.001 0.03 0.978 0.001 0.03 0.972 0.091 0.07 0.166 −0.034 0.04 0.386 −0.066 0.07 0.364 
Age 0.000 0.00 0.262 −0.001 0.00 0.555 0.002 ** 0.00 0.033 -0.004 0.00 0.242 0.001 0.00 0.513 0.002 0.00 0.625 
Obs 252 
Pseudo R2 0.085 
Prob > F <0.001 
Note: Multinomial logit regression with robust standard errors. The table reports the average marginal effects of the independent variables for each category of the dependent variable.  
Obs = observations. Prob > F = p-value of F-test. dy/dx = marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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Table A14. Poisson-logit maximum-likelihood hurdle model. 
Hurdle Model 1 
 
Decision to Contribute Decision of How Much to Contribute
dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Student −0.035 ** 0.016 0.025 0.020 0.272 0.943 
Contribution t−1 0.007 *** 0.001 0.000 0.737 *** 0.045 0.000 
Contribution t−2 0.003 *** 0.001 0.002 0.246 *** 0.027 0.000 
Positive deviation t−1 −0.015 *** 0.002 0.000 −0.303 *** 0.047 0.000 
Negative deviation t−1 −0.010 *** 0.002 0.000 0.519 *** 0.112 0.000 
Period −0.009 *** 0.002 0.000 −0.029 0.024 0.223 
Male −0.011 0.013 0.384 0.159 0.211 0.450 
Married 0.035 0.027 0.201 −0.115 0.247 0.641 
NoReligion −0.028 * 0.015 0.073 −0.054 0.259 0.834 
Degree 0.023 * 0.014 0.095 −0.593 ** 0.238 0.013 
Age 0.001 0.001 0.473 0.022 * 0.012 0.056 
Obs 2520   2292   
Hurdle Model 2 
 
Decision to Contribute Decision of How Much to Contribute
dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Student −0.025 * 0.015 0.091 −0.023 0.294 0.938 
Contribution t−1 0.007 *** 0.001 0.000 0.731 *** 0.045 0.000 
Contribution t−2 0.002 ** 0.001 0.014 0.244 *** 0.027 0.000 
Positive deviation t−1 −0.015 *** 0.002 0.000 −0.304 *** 0.046 0.000 
Negative deviation t−1 −0.009 *** 0.002 0.000 0.512 *** 0.112 0.000 
Period −0.009 *** 0.002 0.000 −0.031 0.024 0.206 
Male −0.014 0.012 0.219 0.137 0.217 0.528 
Married 0.023 0.026 0.362 −0.121 0.248 0.627 
NoReligion −0.017 0.014 0.237 −0.098 0.258 0.704 
Degree 0.010 0.014 0.450 −0.548 ** 0.238 0.021 
Table A14. Cont. 
Hurdle Model 2 
 
Decision to Contribute Decision of How Much to Contribute
dy/dx Std. Err. p > z dy/dx Std. Err. p > z 
Age 0.000 0.001 0.768 0.022 * 0.012 0.079 
Beneficent 0.026 * 0.013 0.055 0.006 0.255 0.981 
Reciprocating −0.110 ** 0.052 0.036 0.632 0.471 0.180 
Individualistic −0.114 ** 0.053 0.030 0.539 0.488 0.269 
Competitive −0.074 0.060 0.218 −0.271 0.690 0.694 
Conditional −0.003 0.017 0.850 0.067 0.263 0.798 
Free rider −0.092 *** 0.025 0.000 −1.077 1.096 0.326 
Unconditional −0.022 0.023 0.340 0.406 0.485 0.403 
Obs 2520   2292   
Notes: The decision to contribute is estimated with a logit model with clustered standard errors at individual 
level. The decision of how much to contribute is estimated with a zero-truncated Poisson model with clustered 
standard errors at individual level. In the table, we report the average marginal effects of the independent 
variables. Obs = observations. dy/dx = marginal effects. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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